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Abstract  The Source Monitoring Framework is a promising model of constructive memory, yet fails because it is connectionist and does not allow content tagging. The Dual‐Process Signal Detection Model is an improvement because it reduces mnemic qualia to a single memory signal (or degree of belief), but still commits itself to non‐discrete representation. By supposing that ‘tagging’ means the assignment of propositional attitudes to aggregates of mnemic characteristics informed inductively, then a discrete model becomes plausible. A Bayesian model of source monitoring accounts for the continuous variation of inputs and assignment of prior probabilities to memory content. A modified version of the High‐Threshold Dual‐Process model is recommended to further source monitoring research. 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Introduction 
 Judging correctly that mental experience M really does refer to event X—rather than say, an imagining or dream—is known as ‘source monitoring’. This paper considers three source monitoring models to explain this mental experience: the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009), Dual‐Process Signal Detection Model (DPSD) (Wixted, 2007) and High‐Threshold Dual‐Process approach (HTDP) (Yonelinas, & Parks, 2007). Both SMF and DPSD suppose that recollection and familiarity occur in degrees. DPSD differs from SMF because it reduces multiple sources of evidence to a single memory strength signal whereas 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SMF avoids a reductionist account. HTDP acknowledges the continuity of phenomenal characteristics of memories, yet retains the view that source identification is a threshold event.  This paper defends a Bayesian Model of Source Monitoring (BMSM) that extends HTDP by going beyond mere ‘familiarity’. I argue that the initial source attribution that M refers to X is a 
ceteris paribus threshold judgment based on prior probabilities and current evidence. This initial judgment, like one’s a priori attempt to identify a shadowy figure is open to scrutiny and able to be reinterpreted in light of additional evidence. Bayesianism explains both heuristic and deliberative inferences.  
Background  The retrieval model of memory is intuitively what happens when we recollect. That is, memories are records of perceptions and thoughts retrieved during recollection. As far back as Aristotle, it was thought that mnemic images were presented to the mind as copies of a previously perceived object, alongside the judgment that one has seen the object before (Sorabji, 2004, p.12).1 The retrieval model was empirically critiqued by Bartlett (1995), when he showed how the context of remembering strongly affected the sort of memories subjects reported. Memories are not neatly labeled and seamlessly retrieved from storage, but constructed from an assortment of prominent feelings, expectations, motivations and complicating perceptual experiences. Bartlett’s constructive account offered a compelling explanation for how memory distortion and false memories could arise in normal circumstances. However, it did not explain how memories are quarantined from imaginings in daily experience. A successful model of memory must account for successful recollections as well as memory mistakes.  
Source Monitoring Framework (SMF)  
                                                        1 This remained the predominant view in analytic philosophy through the 20th century (Russell, 1921; Price, Laird & Wright, 1936; Malcolm, 1977). 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The SMF (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009) explains the constructive theory of memory by supposing that although the same processes are in operation during imagining and remembering, memories are differentiated by systematic differences in perceptual, spatial, temporal, semantic, emotional and cognitive features. Importantly, these characteristics are not tagged or labeled with their sources. The SMF accounts for the impact of cues altering what is recalled in different contexts. For, if memories were cohesively stored, then any activating cue would presumably lift the entire memory into accessibility for the individual, whereas experimental evidence suggests this is not what occurs. For example, experimenters have created false memories in participants using precise combinations of features that elicit a qualitative experience that would normally occur during recollection (Bink et. al., 1999).   The SMF develops David Hume's (1739) theory of vivacity, where memories and imaginings are distinguished by degrees of emotional strength, detailed mental imagery and so forth. However, unlike Hume, the SMF sets itself up in line with a non‐cognitivist view of mental content. That is, instead of memories being retrieved as semantic expressions, memories are inferred from an aggregate of activated nodes in line with a connectionist framework (Lindsay, 2008; McClelland, 2003). Two problems exist for the SMF: 1) the connectionist commitment and 2) the claim that contents are not tagged.  Connectionism is attractive because it allows parallel processing across multiple processing subsystems (Lindsay, 2008, p. 326), non‐discrete processing and a holistic approach to brain processes. It may be that the biological implementation of cognition is a connectionist system (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). However connectionism remains unable to explain the cognitive level of an organism, i.e. the complex representational states that exhibit the systematicity and compositionality of symbolic thought. It is somewhat odd that SMF advocates have chosen this model, when they emphatically state that encoding is not merely associative, but produces complex representations (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000, p.179). Causal connectiveness is the only relation that exists between connectionist nodes. The good news is that a developed SMF does not 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need a connectionist explanation of semantic processing. Classic cognitivist representations can be spread across multiple activation sites in the brain and accommodate the complex array of inputs and influences highlighted by the SMF. It can also account for phenomenal characteristics by assuming a propositional account of the imagination (Nichols, 2006) and mental imagery (Pylyshyn, 2002).  A second commitment of the SMF is that mental experiences are not tagged with their source. Mitchell & Johnson (2000) state, “the characteristics of a mental experience cannot serve as a precise signature or ‘tag’ that specifies its origin” (p.180). That is, each component and qualitative factor that contributes to a mental experience is separable and can accompany a variety of sources. According to Mitchell & Johnson, establishing the source of content is inferential, not a matter of retrieving a description or tag from a unifying memory trace. However, they also acknowledge that source attributions are made “rapidly and relatively nondeliberately following the match‐to‐average‐characteristics heuristic” (2000, p.180). It is not clear how the SMF accounts for both heuristic and deliberative source monitoring. I propose that tagging does occur, but it refers to the contents functional role.   Propositional attitudes, such as ‘REMEMBER’ are procedurally ascribed to content based on aggregates of the content’s characteristics. These heuristic judgments are informed inductively, by prior experience and occurrent evidence. Thus, a memory ‘tag’ is a functional role that inherits content via the Bayesian probability that current experience is similar to a previous experience of remembering. This tagging or sorting, occurs continuously and pre‐consciously for any experience, but can be reflected upon and altered by top‐down processing (see Nichols & Stitch, 2003). A person’s confidence in a memory judgment depends on the evidence available to evaluate them. I propose a Bayesian explanation because it accounts for the equivocality of informal, everyday thought—using both verification and falsification in its method. I now consider whether either DPSD or HTDP offer suitable basis for a Bayesian model of belief revision. 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Dual Process Signal Detection model (DPSD)  The DPSD model (Wixted, 2007) takes seriously the SMF, but suggests that continuous qualitative and quantitative inputs coalesce into a single continuous memory strength variable. Wixted compares his theory with a juror assessing the strength of heterogeneous evidence towards a conviction (p.164). This is analogous to C. I. Lewis’s (2008) Bayesian account of memory2. However, Lewis’ theory is different to DPSD in two key respects. The first is that Lewis’ account depends on independent evidential sources that is not possible on a holistic, SMF, connectionist network.  The second is that memories have an initial credibility, i.e. a non‐zero prior probability (Olsson & Shogenji, 2004). If a subject puts no initial credibility that M relates to X (such as in psychogenic amnesia), then no amount of discounting evidence will affect their judgment. The Bayesian account offers a number of predictions about when subjects will rely on a heuristic judgment and when they will seek additional evidence for beliefs; e.g., common signals provide less information, but novel stimuli prompt evaluation. However, because a Bayesian account requires non‐zero priors (Pr(M is of X) > 0), content must be already tagged as a credible memory upon inspection. Thus, successful source monitoring depends upon discrete judgments.   
High­Threshold Dual­Process Approach (HTDP)  Parks & Yonelinas (2007) HTDP approach supposes that recollection refers to discrete remembering of specific details about an item's prior presentation and 
familiarity refers to a continuous, qualitative degree of recognition.  Recollection is a threshold process (succeed or fail), even though details can be partial. It is a promising model because it accounts for the degrees of confidence with which memories are reported. Additionally it is a non‐connectionist account of cognition that allows for complex representations and the full breadth of                                                         2 Lewis (1946) believed that the congruence between independently generated beliefs can raise the probability of what is remembered analogously to the way agreement of independently given testimonies can convince a juror that what is being testified is true. 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cognitive processes. However, by limiting itself to two processes, the model struggles to explain clearly what is meant by 'familiarity' beyond recognition or judgment. Is ‘familiarity’ a hunch, an intuition or a partial memory? More work needs to be done on the fine‐grained and multi‐faceted processes of source monitoring, to articulate precisely how ‘familiarity’ contributes to source judgments.   
Conclusion  The SMF makes plausible that a wide range of evidential sources, such as imagery, emotions and reflection contribute to source judgments. However, their connectionist commitment and resistance to tagging makes their theory untenable. Contents must be tagged for two reasons. First, in order to have complex, semantic expressions represent events. Second, to furnish a Bayesian account of memory. A Bayesian model allows for both heuristic and deliberative belief revision, but requires the independence of evidential sources and a minimal belief that a current mental experience is a memory. A Bayesian model incorporates findings from the SMF, DPSD and HTDP models of source monitoring and offers a testable hypothesis for future research. More importantly, the model accounts for both successful recollection and errors within a constructive model of memory.  
Word Count: 1,500 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